Omai was allowed to operate unchecked even after the environmental disaster

http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56516822
Saturday, March 24th 2007
Stabroek News

Dear Editor, I read a disturbing letter by one Trevor Atkinson, titled "Omai also made no profit" (07.03.17). Apart from his other non-sequiturs, he charges that Dr Beharry "continues to mislead the Guyanese and international communities that with the presence of Barama in our country our forests will be plundered or are undergoing destruction or depletion". All I can say to this is that I have also read what Dr Beharry has written and can confirm that the suggestion that he is misleading us is a myth. Is it not true that the Barama Company has failed to meet both the Guyanese and international standards? Were it not for Mahadeo Kowlessar, Janette Bulkan, Seelochan Beharry and other writers would we have been publicly informed as to what is going on? And were it not for these writers would Barama be announcing recently in public that it is now putting itself in order? Mr Atkinson assumes that because Dr Beharry once lectured in chemistry at the University of Guyana he is disqualified to "tell the difference between non-conformity with FSC principles and forest destruction." By this Mr. Atkinson is attempting to disqualify all intelligent readers by virtue of their being in another profession. Mathe-maticians, medical doctors, mechanical engineers, you name it. How is it that the state allows judges and juries to make life or death decisions based sometimes on what they learn from expert witnesses in professions other than their own? I well remember Mr NO Poonai, who used to regularly write "A Naturalist's Notebook" up to the time of his death. He had an MS in Conservation, but he was a lawyer by profession. Omai made no profit? To cap it all, Mr Atkinson wants Beharry to tell him why Omai Gold Mines Ltd (OGML) made no profit after 10 years. I suppose Dr Beharry is quite capable of researching the matter, but I was in a better position to know from the local point of view; and I don't suffer from the lack of qualification, irrelevantly applied to him. The lesser spill There was an open forum after the first (smaller, May 1995) cyanide spill to which members of the public were invited. I discovered there that OGML said it could give neither the hour nor the amount of the spill. I was the only person who saw what was wrong with that claim. All the others, including the government officials and the press, concentrated on the environmental impact of the spilled cyanide, not the cause. OGML readily went along with this. The danger, however, was in the complete trust the government gifted Omai, for it was allowed to monitor itself. I learnt there that, apart from the expatriate(s) emp-loyed by OGML, I was the only qualified chemical engineer who knew details of the complex chemical processing of gold ore (I lectured on it in Advanced Inorganic Chem-istry at the University of Guyana). As a chemist I am able to determine what and how much. But as a chemical engineer I am also able to know when, and if not, then why. If OGML did not know how much, then it had failed to apply an elementary mass balance. Simply put, what goes in must come out. In a responsibly run chemical plant, especially where lethal substances like cyanides are involved, all the inputs must balance the outputs. If there is a spill, then the remainder to make up this balance can be calculated. In many ways, except for repulsive toxicity, it is like money. If OGML could not make up a balance it meant that it did not have the flow meters that were supposed to be in place in such a chemical factory. If it did not have the flow meters, it would have contravened basic safety regulations. If it did have the required number of working meters, then it was at the very least, negligent. Not only that: the rate of flow could have allowed an estimate of when it happened and how long for, depending on the nature of the spill, details of which were never released to the public. So why did no one heed what I said? Well, not quite no one: the chemical engineer(s) on the OGML staff would most certainly have paid close attention. At that time I spoke too politely. The government was not wanting to lose an investor that promised much, so in effect it gave OGML the franchise for holding the public forum, all expenses for which the latter would no doubt have had to pay. OGML would also naturally have had to pay for the cleanup, the official enquiry, and the calming of the fears of the public. This meant OGML was going to call the shots in the name of a government investigation. And guess who it was most certainly not going to call on. Saddam Hussein had the same strategy. He claimed his chemical factories were producing agricultural chemicals, not chemicals for warfare, but the UN inspectors were repeatedly not allowed to see what was going on. Unfortunately for him, the USA and the UK took the consequences of the lack of monitoring very seriously. The big spill Guyana is too small to attract that kind of attention. So then came the big spill. Nobody had done any monitoring between the spills, only public relations, because nobody but OGML had the money to employ monitors. I would have done it for free, but there was no hope of me overcoming such vested interests. Nevertheless, soon after the big spill, one enlightened person, knowing my expertise, sent me the results of the measured concentrations of the cyanide as it made its way inexorably up the Essequibo River, and I produced the first charts. These showed that the toxicity had diminished to tolerable levels by the mighty Essequibo River; but I had no means of validating the sampling methods. I got no more data after that. Someone above must have realized the consequences of allowing a properly qualified outsider in. Unaccountability You may well ask if the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was not set up to do the monitoring for the citizens of Guyana - but you must remember who is its overseers. After I read that astonishing claim by OGML that it was not making a profit, I enquired of the EPA specifically how much cyanide was being used by OGML over what period of time. After not getting an answer for some time I put my questions in writing. The written answers came a month later. All were provided by OGML. The EPA was simply passing on information. It generated none of its own on this important environmental case. So much for monitoring! OGML was in effect allowed to operate unchecked (some would say sovereignly) even after the environmental disaster. Who can believe that OGML would invest to become the second largest gold producer in the Americas with what it called in its own brochure 'a low grade mine'? My point is that only the top people in such an internally highly regulated enterprise would know the truth. And we cannot prove otherwise, because we allowed them to monitor themselves without any real regulation. It has been said that everyone makes mistakes, so governments can also make mistakes. But I draw the line at the implication of Mr Atkinson's use of Omai's lack of profit. One mistake does not justify another. Please, Dr Beharry and others, continue to enlighten us. Perhaps it will motivate the politicians to properly staff and equip the Guyana Forestry Commission to do its job of monitoring the use of our heritage in the land of the free. Yours faithfully, Alfred Bhulai

Barama corrects forest management deficiencies

expects reversal of suspension

Sunday, March 18th 2007

Barama Company Limited (BCL) is confident of being back in good stead with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) after a pre-audit inspection by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) shows that the company has fulfilled most of the corrective actions required. The company's five-year FSC certification had been suspended for three months after it failed to live up to stringent environmental and safety standards. Both BCL and its auditor SGS-Qualifor were found to be deficient at varying levels by Accreditation Services International (ASI) after an audit late last year leading to the three-month suspension of BCL's certification. The FSC's Annual Surveillance of SGS for 2006 found that BCL had been deficient on a number of fronts, including harvesting on Amerindian reservations, logging outside of its concession, basic health and safety requirements for workers, no evidence of sustainability in harvesting, failure to perform the relevant environmental impact assessments and the unsafe disposal of environmentally hazardous waste. This newspaper spoke to General Manager of BCL Girwar Lalaram on the steps the company has taken to get back on track with the certification, which would guarantee certain markets in Europe and North America and he said the feedback from the WWF inspector has been positive. "We had a meeting with the auditors in South Africa SGS-Qualifor, and they accepted in writing that there was a lack of communication in terms of the procedure. Further to that, there were procedural lapses where the management of Barama was not given the opportunity formally to make a response to issues raised by the audit team," Lalaram said. Following that meeting, "we went to Germany where we discussed some of the corrective action requirements (CARs) and after prolonged discussion on the issues we agreed that Barama will not seek FSC reinstatement until such time that all the CARs and criteria have been met." ASI's report said areas outside BCL's compartments of forest under evaluation were not managed in the spirit of the FSC and major nonconformities were witnessed. During the ASI surveillance audit, SGS did not adequately evaluate the company's compliance with the company's own procedures regarding illegal activities and FSC requirements. It said too that there was evidence that local indigenous communities had no control over forest management on their land in the areas under direct control of the company outside of compartments 4 and 5. The report said this was because of an exclusive contract signed between the community and a company called IWPI. "Due to this exclusive contract some local people are not allowed to perform forest management operations on their own land and it is BCL that is currently harvesting on these indigenous lands. BCL has a harvesting contract with IWPI and the ASI audit team witnessed the fact that BCL machinery and BCL staff [are] performing harvesting operations in this Amerindian reservation," the report said. According to ASI, BCL said there is nothing it can do because of the contract, but the communities stated that they have not been paid for the last six months for timber that BCL harvested. The affected Amerindian village of Akawini is at the moment seeking to break this agreement with IWPI and has sought the ears of the President and the Minister of Amerindian Affairs. Lalaram said there are signs that Barama will be fully compliant in a very short time. He emphasised that the FSC certification scheme is a voluntary one that is very rigorous with tough hurdles that go far beyond the requirements of the GFC Codes of Practice and national laws related to forestry, environment and safety. "Barama commits itself to this internationally recognised process not only to gain market access but to ensure and to give assurance to the international public that we are performing best practices in forestry," he said. He added that the company was not going to turn back on the FSC programme, whatever the cost. The company has a total of 570,000 hectares certified under the FSC programme, but this is the only portion of concession certified of the company's total 1.6 million hectares. "We are going to proceed in stages as we move towards certification of the entire forest," he said, adding that it will be costly. "But as the biggest player in the sector we have to show leadership by going the way of certification through the FSC," he said. Source : Stabroeknews. http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56516373

Why was Barama negotiating mining contracts on its forestry concession?

Kaieteur News
23 March 2007


Dear Editor,



The forestry business world knows that Barama Company Ltd (Parent
Company - Samling Group) has a forestry concession of 1.69 million
hectares (1/3 of the State Production forests) in the small
impoverished South American nation called Guyana .

What is also acknowledged is that this concession was granted to Barama
with some unbelievable deals, totally in favour of Barama. These
giveaways in effect created a mini-State within the State of Guyana.
Apparently, Barama did not hesitate to use its influence as is
documented below.

What is troubling is that Dr Marcus Colchester (Guyana Fragile Frontier
– (Pub.1997) page 90) reported that: “Also in August 1996 it was
revealed (Caribbean Insight, August 1996) that Golden Star Resources
had entered into an agreement with the Barama Company Ltd to explore
for gold and diamonds in the whole of the logging company's 1.7
million-hectare concession, and the following month a joint exploration
between Broken Hill Properties Co. (BHP) and Golden Star Resources
(GRS) was revealed.” This report if true has serious implications.

Other published sources have also mentioned this deal. Here is some of
the published information (taken from various sources) on the deal
between Barama and the mining Companies.

Indo Caribbean World (Edition of July 17, 1996. Detailed Guyana News
(http://www.guyana.org/GuyNews/icw12.htm) - Golden Star, Barama to sign
mining exploration agreement reported: “Georgetown - Golden Star
Resources and the logging company, Barama, are close to signing an
agreement for gold and diamond exploration in the North West District…”

Forest Peoples Programme Information Update (19 February 1997)
(http://abyayala.nativeweb.org/guyana/guyana2.html) in : ‘Little
progress in the recognition and demarcation of Indigenous lands in
Guyana' reported: “Two mining companies, Golden Star Resources and
Broken Hill Property (BHP) Co. recently entered into a deal with the
Malaysian, Barama, timber company to prospect for gold and diamonds in
Barama's timber concession. Presumably one will cut timber while the
other explores or mines for minerals….”

In the USA's Country Commercial Guide Guyana, Fiscal Year 1999
(http://www.guyanausa.org/Imported/commercial_guide_guyana.htm) it is
reported: 4. ‘Mining Industry Equipment'…‘Another Canadian firm has
been actively engaged in talks with the government about plans to open
a similar operation. Golden Star has also recently signed an agreement
with the Malaysian timber company, Barama, to begin prospecting for
mineral extraction on some of Barama's property. Barama holds timber
concessions for 4.4 million acres, many of which are believed to
harbour significant diamond deposits….”

The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE): GSC News Release Nasd- Otc Bb: ‘GSRSF
Golden Star and BHP enter into joint venture on the Cuyuni property in
Guyana'(all currency amounts in United States dollars unless otherwise
stated) Denver, Colorado – April 25, 2002 , reported: “Golden Star
Resources Ltd. (“Golden Star” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce
that Golden Star and BHP Minerals International Exploration Inc (“BHP”)
have entered into a joint venture to acquire two prospecting licences
in the Cuyuni district in Guyana, which is located approximately 140
kilometers from the country's capital, Georgetown (the “Cuyuni
Property”). BHP is a member company of BHP Billiton Limited. BHP will
have an 80% managing interest in the joint venture and will fund 100%
of all project expenditures up to the completion of a bankable
feasibility study. Golden Star will have a 20% interest in the joint
venture and will be free carried until the completion of the bankable
feasibility study.”

“The Cuyuni Property, which covers an area of 104 square kilometers, is
prospective for copper and gold and is being acquired from Barama
Company Limited (“Barama”). Under the agreement with Barama, BHP will
pay to Barama (i) $65,000 upon the signing of the agreement, (ii)
$10,000 upon the transfer of the prospecting licences for the Cuyuni
Property into the name of BHP, (iii) $25,000 per year on the
anniversary of the signing of the agreement as an advance royalty
payment, (iv) $250,000 for each mine site developed by BHP as a further
advance royalty payment, (v) 1.0% of the capitalized exploration and
development cost of each new mine site as a cash payment upon
commencement of commercial production, and (vi) a net profits royalty
of 5%. The advance royalty payments are deductible from the net profits
royalty. In addition, BHP may spend up to $3.5 million on direct
exploration activities within the first five years following the issue
of the prospecting licences….”

Stabroek News (April 27, 2002
http://www.landofsixpeoples.com/gynewsjs.htm) reported (in ‘Golden
Star, Billiton eyeing gold, copper mining in Cuyuni US$3.5M could be
spent in five years'): Golden Star Resources Ltd has entered into a
joint venture to acquire two prospecting licences in the Cuyuni with
BHP Minerals International Exploration Inc, which will plug US$3.5
million into exploration in the first five years. In a press release
issued by Golden Star (See abovementioned statement) earlier this week,
it was stated that the Cuyuni property, covering an area of 104 square
kilometres, is believed to have copper and gold and is being acquired
from Barama Company Ltd. …”

Dr. Keith Barron (in STRAIGHT TALK ON MINING, No.16, April 28, 2002.)

http://www.straighttalkonmining.com/docs/pdf/stom16.pfd in “There's
gold in them hills!” stated: “Golden Star Resources Ltd. and BHP
Minerals International Exploration Inc. have announced a 20:80 joint
venture over an area of 104 square kilometres in Northwestern Guyana.
The “Cuyuni Property” as it is known, is being acquired from the Barama
Company Ltd. for cash, a royalty interest, and other considerations.

Golden Star closed their Georgetown office a few years ago, and BHP
left Guyana back in 1999. They had formerly been joint venture
partners….”

The almost identical abovementioned reports (from different sources -
local and international) show that Barama was making, or attempting to
make deals with the mining companies. Under Guyanese law, not even a
Guyanese Company or any Guyanese individual (Amerindians included)
is/are allowed to make large private deals with international mining
companies. Mining deals must be approved by the relevant Government
authorities – deals cannot be done independently without Government's
authorisation and involvement. Yet in all the above reported deals, we
see that Barama apparently thought that it had the legal powers (or
maybe Government's approval) to negotiate separate deals openly with
mining companies. We must ask who gave Barama the necessary permission
to enter into such negotiations without Government's authorisation and
involvement. If no permission was given then would this not be a
violation of Guyanese Law by Barama? How could the State of Guyana not
know what is going on before negotiations got that far? (The
information was coming out since 1996.)

One would have thought that, it should have been the Government of
Guyana that would be negotiating mining rights.

The interests of the state of Guyana were apparently not represented in
the negotiations between Barama and the Mining Companies. Mercifully,
for some reason(s) the deal was stopped. Maybe Barama and the
Government officials can enlighten us as to what happened.

What the proposed agreement also showed is that Barama knew how to
skillfully negotiate a contract favourable to itself - unlike the one
given to it by the Government of Guyana in1992. The Barama Company
Ltd.'s negotiators : (1) wanted all payment in US dollars.; (2) initial
signing bonus, (3) advance royalty payments; (4) payment for each mine
set up on its concession; and (5) five percent on any profits. Barama
also knew that if mining followed forestry, then there would be no need
for any reforestation efforts or any need to observe the Guyana
Forestry Commission (GFC) and or Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC)
forestry harvesting and environmental guidelines.

Barama's illegal actions were ignored by the Guyanese Government and
Business community. Instead the Barama Company was commended: “The
foreign-owned Barama Company Limited (BCL) has, for the second time in
three years, won the President's Award for the Export Achievement at
the Guyana Manufacturers' Association (GMA) 2002 Annual Dinner.”
(http://landofsixpeoplpes.com/news022/ns211258.htm)

Too bad the Guyanese negotiators (in their Barama deal) did not make a
similar deal for their ‘green' gold, viewing each tree as a mini gold
mine. It also reveals something about the Guyanese authorities (GFC,
Guyana Geology and Mining Concession (GGMC), and Government), that they
are sadly asleep at the switch. The FSC guidelines require Companies to
be incompliance with local laws in order to get a FSC certification of
good forestry management and practices.

Is attempted robbery still a criminal offence in Guyana?

Was Barama ever penalised (charged, fined) for breaking or attempting
to circumvent the laws of Guyana? If not, why were no charges ever
laid? Is it a question of diplomatic immunity? Can any Guyanese get
away with trying to claim and sell the country's assets?



Seelochan Beharry

Guyana And The Wider World

http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56516380

Stabroek News


Guyana’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP)
and the forestry sector

The Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),
crafted out of nation-wide participatory consultations
and published in 2001, set out the parameters of
poverty in Guyana, analysed the contributory factors
and detailed a road map for poverty alleviation or eradication.
President Jagdeo announced late last year that “Guyana will
commence negotiations with the IMF next year, with a view to
coming up with a successor programme to the just concluded
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF)” (Stabroek News,
December 24, 2006).
At the turn of the millennium, Guyana was still suffering
from a continuing high incidence of poverty: “In 1999, Guyana
completed a Living Conditions Survey [which] indicated a
reduction in poverty levels. The proportion of the population
living below the poverty line was found to be 35 per cent
with 19 per cent living under conditions of extreme poverty”
(PRSP, p. 5). While no more recent data on poverty have been
published, the Guyana economy has not grown in the ensuing
years.
The PRSP set out the causes of poverty thus: “Although
no one factor, or group of factors, may be singled out as the
cause and effect of poverty, the evidence in Guyana suggests
that low and/or negative economic growth accounted for
the pervasive and persistent level of poverty in the country.
This, in turn, stemmed from (i) poor economic policies; (ii)
poor governance; (iii) non-complementing growth-oriented
infrastructure; and (iv) deterioration in the quantum and
quality of social services” (PRSP, p. 7).
Like all other national policy documents, the PRSP
celebrated Guyana’s natural resource endowment. According
to the PRSP, most of the poor in Guyana live in the interior
Regions, coterminous with Guyana’s forest cover. This article
begins to consider the question: Why is there persistent poverty
in the interior alongside the parcelling out of Guyana’s best
endowed forests in large-scale forestry concessions? Do the
reasons for persistent poverty, as diagnosed by the PRSP, apply
to the forestry sector? This article examines the fi rst two causes
of poverty according to the PRSP.
Poor economic policies
During the late 1960s and early 1970s the UN’s Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) assisted the Guyana Forest
Department with reconnaissance inventories of forests.
Compared with much of African and Asian tropical rainforests
the forests of Guyana have low stocking and a high proportion
of hard and heavy timbers.
Almost uniformly the FAO specialists believed that these
limitations called for economies of scale, with low intensity,
low cost, low impact logging at long intervals, with value
added through effi cient industries, undertaken by private
sector concessionaires and managed with much greater
technical understanding and marketing skills than the local
timber industry then displayed; what might now be termed ‘a
knowledge economy.’ FIDS also suggested provision for smallscale
operators having limited capital, but the main emphasis
was on economy of scale.
In the middle of these technical developments, in 1970, the
then government took control of ‘the commanding heights of
the economy’ and civil servants were appointed to run private
sector operations.
As the economy faltered, massive and ill-advised ventures
such as the Demerara Woods enterprise at Mabura soaked up
money. Loans and credits from Canadian CIDA failed to restore
profi tability to the majority of private logging operations
or sawmills that lacked political connections. Spare parts
and working credit were so scarce that the forest industry
became moribund. The almost unbelievable decision by local
sawmillers to install sash gang saws (suitable for perfectly
sound conifer logs but entirely inappropriate for defective
tropical hardwoods) contributed to loss-making enterprises.
Liberalisation of the economy after 1985 was not
accompanied by an understanding of the national safeguards
for foreign direct investments (FDI). OECD guidelines for
multinational enterprises and on transfer pricing were
apparently overlooked when the give-away arrangement with
Barama was negotiated in 1991.
Although they are not in the public domain, the later FDI
arrangements for other foreign-owned loggers seem to have
been equally incompetent, judging by the way in which the
expatriates have been allowed to export unprocessed logs
instead of demonstrating best practice in timber processing.
The 1997 National Forest Policy (NFP) provides for operation
of small mobile in-forest sawmills, but only very recently is
this policy being put into practice in any notable way.
Poor governance
The second criticism in the PRSP concerns the weak and
inconsistent application of law and policies. Studies for the GFC
during 1994-6 showed that resource access taxes had failed to
be adjusted for the falling exchange rate and for infl ation and
were then amongst the lowest in the world. Political lobbying
has prevented correct updating of taxes, so the country is
receiving only around ten per cent of the volume-based tax
revenue from resource access rights compared with Malaysia.
It gets worse. Even our low taxes are not actually collected
effi ciently by the GFC and over US$ 1 million was owed by the
major logging companies up to August 2005. The NFP requires
the GFC to pay area-related forest taxes into the Consolidated
Fund, but external reviewers confi rmed that up until 2001
the GFC had not done this. There is no report on whether
the Ministry of Finance has demanded its due or whether it
demanded the 20-year backlog of taxes. The 1979 GFC Act
requires the Minister of Finance to tell the GFC what to pay
into the Consolidated Fund but the NFP requires the GFC to
take the initiative.
The 1980 national constitution and four national policies,
plus the PPP/C’s own 2006 manifesto, all promote in-country,
value-added processing of our natural resources. However,
what we see is an increasing proportion of prime hardwood
timber logs being exported without processing. Of course this
is the most profi table action from the point of view of personal
private gain. But national policy requires our natural resources
to be used for maximum net social benefi t, the public good,
not private gain. Until we invest in modern machinery and
marketing for furniture and fl ooring, highest technical
effi ciency in transformation from timber log to furniture may
be achieved by exporting logs to the modern mills in China
and the ramshackle but integrated industries in India. But
economic theory then requires that we tax the excess rent
obtained through log exports, so that it is the nation rather
than the foreign logger who benefi ts most.
This is not happening. The proposal of the Minister of
Agriculture for “forming a ministerial committee to look at
developing and advising on a log exporting policy for Guyana”
in the future does nothing to solve the increasing problems
today (‘No evidence so far of forestry transfer pricing -Persaud,’
Stabroek News, Monday, January 29, 2007).
Janette Bulkan
CFA Governing Council
guyanaforestry.blogspot.com


Source :
Commonwealth Forestry Association Newsletter number 36, March 2007, pages
8-9.

Old (Previous) Guyana Forestry Blog

This blog was first started at:

http://guyanaforestry.blogspot.com/

Guyana - Barama - "Hard to get reliable information" - labour recruitment by Barama or its agents

Stabroeknews
Wednesday, March 21st 2007
http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56516553

Dear Editor,

I am grateful to the many writers who have brought the improper exploitation of Guyana's forestry resources to the notice of the public. I share their deep concern.

Exploitation

A 16-year-old former ward of the charity for which I worked, told me he and two others were 'employed' by persons claiming to be recruiting for Barama. On their first assignment they were left stranded for three days on the riverside in a remote Essequibo region without food. They were only rescued after risking their lives on the river to get to within hailing distance of a passing boat. They were too poor and too illiterate to get justice, or even the supposed pay for their first 3 days of 'work'.

It was difficult for me to have made a check on the identity of the recruiters, so this can in no way constitute an accusation against Barama, but the company has done its credibility no good by failing to uphold its end of the overly generous concessions it obtained from our politicians.

This story is at least evidence that exploiters well know where to go to get their labour. In this case it was from North Sophia. It can also be used as an example for trying to convince street children and other truants of the importance of at least a basic education.

Information?

Perhaps, editor, or reader, you can advise me as to which agency of the State might exist to investigate and rectify such an injustice should it happen again. I did once in desperation, after fruitless runnings around, telephone the then Government Information Service (GIS) to find out which ministry or agency addressed a certain difficulty. I was put through to the manager, who readily admitted to the logic of my request, but oh so regretfully informed me that the agency was not outfitted to help me get that information. Within a year of that the Ministry of Information disappeared and GIS probably morphed into GINA.

Ability to think

If nothing else that ministry, from my acquaintance with it since the 1970's, has been mainly responsible for the successful propaganda to a sufficient number of especially young, impressionable citizens, who could otherwise have been motivated to contribute to their own and to our collective development, that

1. We as Guyanese really know very little: 'Massah' (the government or overseas expertise) knows best.

2. We are not (therefore) important enough to merit being answered, even tokenly, by Massah; so don't bother to ask; just hope you don't get into trouble. The poets have, I believe, written in vain about such mental environments.

And so, in the 21st century, 40 years after independence, apart from those who see no option but to take matters of their own and our existence into their hands, I find the vast majority of students looking for knowledge that is deducible or otherwise obtainable by simple observation. And they get it by copy - from official government sources, or from overseas sources (internet, etc.), or from what the most influential of them has copied.

Mr. Clarence Trotz has done us a favour in co-authoring that new Physics textbook. I look forward to reading it. Unfortunately the subject has too few students (who then tend to go and remain overseas) because it forces us to deduce results from scientifically established principles, all based on accurate observation. Let us hope the book helps to advance the self-belief in the ability to think that that indefatigable educator, now author, has always sought to encourage in his students.

Yours faithfully,

Alfred Bhulai

Editor's note

The proper place to report a job-related abuse of the kind you mention would be at the Labour Department in the Ministry of Labour, Human Services and Social Security at 1 Water Street, Georgetown. The Chief Labour Officer is Mr. M. Akeel A.A.

Guyana and the wider world

Trading in forest concessions - against forest policy and law

By Janette Bulkan

Sunday, March 18th 2007
Stabroeknews
http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article?id=56516380

Today's column considers the (ab)use of forestry concessions as tradable commodities by Asian FDI-benefiting (Foreign Direct Investment) companies, practices that are against forest law and policy in Guyana. Why is trading against policy? Because the April 1993 Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC) policy says that, * "It is the policy of the Government of Guyana that its forest shall be managed on a sustainable basis and in an environmentally sound manner to produce the maximum benefits for the people of Guyana" - that is, the maximum net social benefit to which I have referred often. * The 1993 policy also says, "No additional areas will be granted to Timber Sales Agreement (TSA) holders until they have demonstrated their ability to work existing concessions for maximum sustained yield" and "Failure to work a concession… may lead to cancellation of the TSA." These two bullet points should have prevented the GFC from allowing under-utilised concession holders from acquiring more than one TSA. The same bullet points should also have prevented Barama from acquiring the Barama Housing Incorporated (BHI) SFEP, soon to be rolled over into a TSA, because Barama acknowledges that it harvests much less than the average of 20 m3/ha, which is what the GFC says it should. The second of the quoted bullet points and the violations of the legal articles quoted at the end of this column should have resulted in cancellation of the concessions. If the GFC actually had a strategic plan for allocating concessions as stated in the 1997 National Forest Policy and the 2001 National Forest Plan, the rescinded areas would have been re-allocated through the open bidding process. It is illogical to have an open bidding process for new concessions and allow under-the-table trading of under-used concessions, and it is also against the policy favouring net social benefit, besides being illegal. The evidence from the Asian end of the value chain shows that Guyana is treated as if a 'For Sale' sign has been hung up at our doors. Forestry concessions are being rented for large sums of money, with no regard to the terms of the agreement. The concession licence is still ostensibly with the original holder. The Asian trading companies are no doubt secure in the knowledge that the lack of coordination between regulatory agencies (Guyana Forestry Commission, Guyana Revenue Authority, Ministry of Home Affairs, Customs) gives free reign to their international wheeling and dealing. In his message on the occasion of Chinese New Year, China's Ambassador Zhang Jungao's singled out two Chinese companies for special mention: "Last year also saw a breakthrough of co-operation between the private sectors of both countries in promoting the economic development in Guyana spearheaded by Bosai [bauxite] and Bai Shan Lin [forestry]." (Guyana Chronicle, February, 2007). However, there is little evidence so far - as tracked in Guyana's GDP or local employment, or workers' salaries or contributions to PAYE or NIS - of commensurate benefits from Asian logging companies to Guyana's development. Guyana's logging and milling sector have been reduced in the past 10 years to raw commodity supplier of prime timber species in log form to Asian countries, at the lowest prices for comparable timbers globally. The Asian market, the beneficiary of this 'Chinese (and Indian) takeaway,' absorbed 98 per cent of the total volume of logs exported from Guyana in 2006. Log exports as a percentage of log production in Guyana increased from 35 per cent in 2005 to 44 per cent in 2006. 82 per cent of all log exports in 2006 went to two Asian countries - India and China - importing 41 per cent each. The remaining 16 per cent of exported logs went to seven other Asian countries (Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Malaysia). The Initial Public Offerings (IPO) and letters to shareholders on acquisitions in Guyana take no account of forest policy in Guyana aimed at promoting downstream in-country processing, local employment and skills creation. On the contrary, one conglomerate, Seapower Resources International Limited (listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange) which acquired 51 per cent ownership of Jaling, holder of forestry concessions in Guyana, during September 2006 stated in its September 1 'Letter from the Board': "At present, the only exporting country for the Joint Venture is the People's Republic of China and the Directors confirmed that the Company has no intention to sell the harvested timber in the local market of Guyana or any other market" (p. 29). A sense of the intricacies of the trades involving the forests of Guyana can be conveyed by the following 'definitions' of terms mentioned in the quotation above, and set out in Seapower Resources International Limited's Letter from the Board: " 'Joint Venture' - W and J Forest Resources Development Limited, a joint venture company incorporated in Hong Kong on 1 December 2005 for the purpose of, amongst other things, the operation and management of the Forest, owned as to 50 percent by the Target and Mr Chu Wenze respectively" "'Joint Venture Agreement' - a joint venture agreement dated 22 December 2004, entered into among the Target and four independent natural persons from the People's Republic of China, as amended from time to time, to set up and operate the Joint Venture." " 'Forest' - the forests granted or approved to be granted to the Target by the Guyana Forestry Commission of an aggregate area of approximately 164,800 hectares (407,000 acres) mainly located in the north bank of Amakura River, the south bank of Baramita Amerindian Reserve and Whana River, the east bank of Whannamaparu and Whana River and the west bank of border with Venezuela, State Forest of Guyana, South America, which the Target has obtained an exclusive timber concession right for a period of 25 years." " 'PRC Joint Venture Partners' - four natural persons in the People's Republic of China, including Mr Chu Wenze, whom have founded the Joint Venture with the Target." " 'Target' - Jaling Forest Industries Inc., a private company incorporated in Guyana, South America with limited liability." Ten days before the Chinese Ambassador's New Year's message, Bai Shan Lin's 'President,' Mr Chu Wenze, held a press conference in Georgetown at which, inter alia, he stated that his company would invest US $100 million in Guyana, and that it was in partnership with Beijing Uni-Construction Company (BUCC) which had a 49 per cent share and was the source of funding for the Guyana operation ('Chinese firm plans US $100 million investment here, Guyana Chronicle, February 9, 2007). A week before Mr Chu Wenze's press conference a Stabroek News report noted that Bai Shan Lin's website stated that it planned to invest US $4.5 million in Guyana ('Chinese firm to process logs from Jaling concession,' Stabroek News, January 30, 2007). How credible is the jump from US $4.5 million to $100 million in a week? The same newspaper report detailed the company's claim on its website that it had rights to 400,000 hectares of forest in Guyana, although the two blocks of JaLing's Timber Sales Agreement (TSA 02/05) amount to only 137,000 ha. At his press conference Mr Chu Wenze alluded to the 'souring' of a business relationship between Bai Shan Lin and Jaling, and further stated that his company was "also in the process of acquiring its own forest concession so that it would be assured of a reliable supply of logs for its downstream activities" ('New Chinese forest company pledges to invest US$100M,' Stabroek News, February 9, 2007, http://www.stabroeknews.com/index. pl/article?id=56513688). An auditor's report to the shareholders of Seapower Resources International Limited (incorporated in the Cayman Islands with limited liability) noted, "On 10 April 2006, the Company and Wild Forest Limited, its wholly-owned subsidiary, entered into an acquisition agreement to acquire a 51 percent equity interest of Jaling Forest Industries Inc., a private company incorporated in Guyana, South America, for a consideration of HK$154 million [US$19,794,344]." Not a bad piece of small change for Danny Chan, the principal of Jaling. This company is notorious in local press reports for its poor treatment of its very few Guyanese forestry workers (60 compared with 140 Asian workers, completely at odds with the ratio stated by Minister Robert Persaud at his press conference on December 8, 2006), non-compliance with its business plans negotiated under secret FDI concessionary terms, and single-minded focus on exporting prime timber species in log form to China. Whatever the Chinese companies in Guyana fight among themselves about, they rest secure in the knowledge that there is little government interest or oversight of their activities. In the Guiana Shield countries of Guyana and Suriname, Chinese companies are popping up at every node of the production-to-consumption market chains for timber, taking advantage of lax regulatory regimes, and the under-priced and un-monitored export of hardwood timbers. The practices detailed above of private deals which transfer forestry concessions in Guyana are illegal. The relevant legislation is detailed below: 'Landlording' is the practice in which the legal holder of a forest harvesting concession gives up managerial control and rents it out to another enterprise. This practice is illegal under Forest Regulations 1953, Article 12 - "No transfer of any lease or timber sales agreement shall be made by any forest officer without the prior approval of the President where such lease or timber sales agreement grants exclusive rights to any person over an area estimated to exceed three thousand acres or is for an unexpired period exceeding three years." Landlording is illegal under Condition 13 of Timber Sales Agreements - "The grantee shall not transfer, sublet, mortgage or otherwise dispose of any interest arising under this agreement except in accordance with the Forest Regulations and any purported disposition made except in accordance with such regulations shall be null and void." Landlording is also illegal under Condition 2 of 16 of State Forest Permissions - "This Permit is not transferable without the prior consent in writing of the Commissioner. It may not be assigned or sublet nor may the grantee allow any person to work under it on payment to the Grantee of any consideration whatsoever." Landlording can be permitted only with express Presidential authority (the President being the Minister of Forestry, as opposed to the quotidian control by the Minister for Forestry, who is usually also the Minister of Agriculture). Landlording is differentiated from 'sprinting' which was a long-standing practice by which concession holders would contract in labour for specific tasks, but without in any way passing on managerial control. Next week I shall continue to examine the Asian end of the value chain against the stated national forest policy and forest law.